Formalising deductive coherence : an application to norm evaluation by Joseph, Sindhu et al.
Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona
Programa de Doctorat en Informa`tica
Formalising Deductive
Coherence: An Application to
Norm Evaluation
October 14, 2008
Memo`ria presentada per Sindhu Joseph
per optar al Diploma d’Estudis Avanc¸ats
sota la direccio´ del Prof. Carles Sierra i
el Dr. Marco Schorlemmer.
Institut d’Investigacio´ en Intel·lige`ncia Artificial
Consell Superior d’Investigacions Cientı´fiques

Preface
This dissertation is a contribution to the formalisation of Thagard’s coherence theory.
The term coherence is defined as the quality or the state of cohering, especially a
logical, orderly, and aesthetically consistent relationship of parts. Cognitive coherence
in particular is the coherence theory based explanation of the mind which evaluates
the truth of a cognition in terms of it being a member of some suitably defined body
of other cognitions: a body that is consistent, coherent, and possibly endowed with
other virtues, provided these are not defined in terms of truth. Thus a coherent set
is interdependent such that every element in it contributes to the coherence. We take
Thagard’s proposal of a coherence set as that of maximising satisfaction of constraints
between elements and explore its use in normative multiagent systems. We demonstrate
its use as a mechanism to introduce true autonomy in agents, particularly in a normative
multiagent setting.
In particular, we propose a coherence-driven agent, an agent that is driven by co-
herence maximisation. To design such an agent, we introduce a general coherence
framework with the necessary computable functions. Further we analyse the formal
properties of coherence so that we could make the framework fully computational. We
use a proof-theoretic characterisation of coherence based on the principles proposed
by Thagard. For the purpose of demonstration, we focus on one particular type of co-
herence namely, deductive coherence. Our use of graded logic helps us to incorporate
reasoning under uncertainty which is more realistic in the context of multiagent sys-
tems. Finally, we explore a scenario where a coherence-driven agent deliberates about
norms in a multiagent system where there is competition for a common resource. We
show how a coherence-driven agent decides to violate a norm guided by its coherence,
while also considering other factors such as sanctions and rewards.
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Commission under contract number FP6-027253 and the Generalitat de Catalunya,
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A normative multiagent system is a multiagent system where the agent interactions
are governed by norms. In these systems, norms are identified with obligations, per-
missions and prohibitions, which specify the ideal behaviour of agents. Such systems
also consider constitutive norms to give a new meaning to certain behaviour of agents.
While a normative multiagent system is prescriptive about agent behaviour, it does so
within the framework of autonomous agents. That is, the system assumes agents to be-
have in an autonomous manner and reason about norms autonomously. This is because
of the fact that the success of such systems does not depend on all the agents following
the prescribed norms blindly, rather on having rational agents deliberating about the
prescribed norms, evaluating their usefulness, selectively following those norms that
improve their efficiency, and effecting a change when there are conflicts, inefficiencies,
or situational changes that they can perceive.
From the perspective of an agent, norms are like a guide book for an agent to make
sense of what goes on around and what is expected of it. Norms are often meant to
have a positive influence in a normative multiagent system, however, there may be
cases where their implementations fail to translate this. In certain other cases, agents
may have beliefs or goals which are in conflict with some of the norms, or there may
even be cases where norms are in conflict between themselves. Thus both from the
perspectives of normative systems and that of individual agents, it is not beneficial to
treat norms like a hardwired goal in the agent architecture, rather they should be treated
like dynamic entities that are deliberated before being adopted or obeyed.
We are certainly not the first to identify this need, and there have been numerous
attempts in the recent past explicitly addressing this issue [19, 9, 4, 20, 31, 17]. Many of
these efforts are focused towards extending the cognitive agent theory (for instance the
Belief, Desire, and Intention (BDI) theory) with explicit representation of norms such
as in BOID [6], EMIL [9], and NoA [17], or propose a more comprehensive multiagent
system architecture that is norm-aware as in [4]. However, apart from providing static-
priority based autonomy1 and recognising autonomous norm acceptance phases, a gap
still exists to enrich agent theories with true autonomy.
1A norm priority agent will always prefer norm compliance over satisfaction of private goals when there
is a conflict.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
To enhance the autonomous capabilities of agents, we propose a normative agent
theory which extends the BDI theory with the theory of coherence [26]. Coherence
theory, when used to explain human reasoning, proposes that humans accept or reject
a cognition (external or internal) depending on how much it contributes to maximise
the constraints imposed by situations and other cognitions. Pasquier et al. [20] intro-
duced the possibility of extending agent reasoning with Thagard’s theory of coherence.
While their contribution introduces the concept of coherence in the field of multiagent
systems, they still do not clarify the nature of a coherence relation nor do they specify
how a coherence graph can be constructed. Thus, a general treatment of coherence to
be used to realise computational models is still called for.
According to the theory of coherence, there are coherence and incoherence rela-
tions between pieces of information depending on whether they support (yielding a
positive constraint) or contradict (yielding a negative constraint) each other. If two
pieces of information are not related, then, there is no coherence (constraint) between
them. Due to the fact that coherence is evaluated based on constraints that exist be-
tween pairs of information, a graph representation is most intuitive. Normally a graph
with nodes and weighted edges are used to represent the pieces of information and con-
straints between them. Given such a coherence graph, Thagard defines a mechanism
to compute the overall coherence of the graph based on maximising constraint satis-
faction between pairs of nodes. Certain principles are also defined to characterise and
differentiate various types of coherence relations that might exist between pairs. Un-
derstanding these principles and deducing methods to compute the coherence values
between them is fundamental to compute the overall coherence of a given coherence
graph. Without this important formalisation, practical realisations of coherence are
hard to imagine.
In this dissertation we have chosen to analyse one such type of coherence, namely
deductive coherence, because the theorems of logical deduction from which it is de-
rived are well understood. Our aim is to generate coherence values between pairs of in-
formation (in this case, formulas in a logical language) by formalising the relationship
between coherence and logical entailment. Coherence as a logical relation is signifi-
cant in itself and has important implications: it is tolerant to inconsistencies and allows
us to work with deductive systems without certain structural rules such as weakening.
More specifically the research questions addressed in this dissertation are along two
dimensions: the first is to look for an appropriate model or theory to extend the existing
agent theories; the second is to check its computational validity. That is:
How can we design normative agents with more autonomous capabilities
such that they can rationally evaluate norms in the light of their cognitions?
If the theory of coherence is proposed to extend agent theories for auton-
omy, is it computationally realisable? What are the tools required to make
a fully computational model of a normative coherence-driven agent?
We address the first question by following other researchers [20] to propose the theory
of coherence for autonomous normative agent design. Though the theory has been
proposed earlier to extend BDI agents in the context of communication, it has not been
proposed as a general theory in the context of normative systems. We address the
3second question by proposing a clear method, illustrating how a coherence based agent
can reason autonomously about norms and cognitions by the process of coherence
maximisation. We list the important steps in the process as follows.
Given a set of graded agent cognitions and a set of graded norms (norms with priorities)
of a normative multiagent system,
1. evaluate the coherence or incoherence relations between pairs of cognitions of
the same type and between pairs of norms;
2. evaluate coherence or incoherence relations between pairs of cognitions of dif-
fering types and norms;
3. given that all possible coherence or incoherence relations are computed for cog-
nitions and norms, evaluate the overall coherence of the agent as if the agent
were to accept all the cognitions and all the norms;
4. separate the set of cognitions and norms into two sets by a process of coherence
maximisation such that only elements of one set are considered to be accepted
(considered valid);
5. and finally, based on specific agent characteristics, a coherence maximising ac-
tion is pursued if the increase in coherence corresponding to the accepted set is
substantially higher when compared to the case in which the agent pursues all
cognitions and norms.
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the state of the art by
summarising some of the prominent works in related fields and by elaborating how our
work stands in relation with them. In Chapter 3 we give a general introduction to the
theory of coherence, which helps the reader to understand the basic notions of coher-
ence and how it differs from other related theories. We then introduce Thagard’s theory
of coherence and contrast it with other decision theories. In Chapter 4 we introduce a
generic coherence framework which can be used to create coherence-based agents. We
discuss in this framework how pieces of information can be organised in the form of
a graph, along with the necessary computable functions to evaluate and maximise the
coherence of such a graph. Chapter 5 narrows down the focus to one particular type of
coherence, namely deductive coherence. In this chapter, we provide a proof theoretic
formulation of deductive coherence which we use to build coherence graphs given a set
of pieces of information. Formal properties of the deductive coherence function enable
us to compute coherence values between pieces of information. With this work, we
intent to demonstrate that our proposed framework is fully computational.
In Chapter 6, we define a coherence-driven agent as a cognitive agent whose aim
is to maximise coherence. For this purpose we define certain specific graphs corre-
sponding to a cognitive agent. We adapt concepts taken from multi-context systems
so that our coherence-driven agent can reason across cognitions and norms. We later
sketch a procedure an agent may follow in the context of a normative multiagent sys-
tem. Chapter 7 gives a detailed example inspired from a real-world scenario where a
few southern regions of India participate in a water sharing normative system to share a
common commodity, water, according to needs and quantity available. We in particular
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consider two representative regions with one releasing water and the other receiving it
under the agreements of the treaty. We study the reasoning of one of the agents and
demonstrate that how this coherence-driven agent autonomously makes choices to ac-
cept a norm based on coherence maximisation. Later, however, due to the changes in
the situation, it discovers through coherence maximisation that it is impossible to keep
its private goals and also follow the norm it has been committed to. This example opens
the possibility of agents deliberating autonomously which brings new challenges and
possibilities to the study of normative multiagent systems.
Finally in Chapter 8 we conclude the work by discussing the important issues ad-
dressed in this dissertation, the challenges left open, and a few pointers to some of the
the ongoing and future work. In particular, we discuss two specific instances of the
ongoing work. The first attempts to demonstrate that coherence is an holistic notion
and is inclusive of rationality. For this purpose we show that, the utility maximisation
concept from a game theoretic context can be reduced to a particular type of coherence
graph. The second introduces a semantic interpretation of coherence inspired by Rus-
pini’s degrees of consistency. This opens up new possibilities to give a computational
representation of other types of coherence other than deductive. We conclude with
bibliography of important references used for this dissertation.
Chapter 2
State of the Art
The objective of this dissertation is twofold: to help design increasingly sophisticated
agents with autonomous capabilities, and to demonstrate how agents who have au-
tonomous abilities would take flexible and dynamic decisions when faced with dynamic
and uncertain scenarios. We are particularly interested to bring in autonomous agents
in the context of normative systems and to demonstrate that from the point of view
of an agent, autonomy helps in evaluating norms rather than following designer spec-
ifications without deliberation. On the other hand, we aim to formalise the theory of
coherence in a generic and computationally plausible manner so as to build coherence-
driven agents that are autonomous. To this end, in this chapter we present work done in
the fields of autonomous agent deliberation, normative systems and autonomous norm
evaluation, and previous approaches in formalising coherence.
2.1 Autonomous Agent Deliberation
From the years that agent theory came into existence, autonomy is one of the most
desired features to be incorporated in the agent design. The first major step was made
when a behaviour model of agents was proposed. The BDI model for artificial agents
is based on the theory of rational action in humans put forward in 1988 by the philoso-
pher M. Bratman [5]. BDI is fundamentally reliant on folk psychology which is the
notion that our mental models of the world are theories. BDI logics are multi-modal
logics developed by Rao and Georgeff during the 1990s. However, the BDI model
of agents was an attempt to solve a problem that has more to do with planning than
with the design of autonomous agents. Yet, the BDI model served as the base model
on which others could build more sophisticated features. From BDICTL of Rao and
Georgeff’s, LORA (the logic of rational agents) [30] to BOID [6], there have been nu-
merous proposals to incorporate various levels of autonomy in agent design. However,
as mentioned in the introduction, other than incorporating certain static priority based
reasoning components into agent theories, we still lack sophisticated reasoning tools to
make agents autonomous entities.
The work of Pasquier et al. [20] is an attempt at bringing more autonomous and dy-
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namic reasoning into agent theories. They propose a cognitive coherence based model
of communication, argumentation and reasoning from an agents perspective. The au-
thors have developed a computational model of cognitive coherence which could be
used to extend the agents reasoning mechanism to include social commitments. Their
work is based, like ours, on the characterisation of coherence as maximising constraint
satisfaction proposed by Thagard [26]. Thagard in his characterisation of coherence,
differentiates types of coherence that need to be accounted for in order to formalise co-
herence. In our proposal we develop further this idea of Thagard and take the first step
in this direction by giving a proof-theoretic characterisation of deductive coherence.
Our approach differs from Pasquier et al. because our research is centered on calculat-
ing coherence measures. We understand coherence as a tool not only for maintaining
the cognitions of individual agents but also for that of agents’ society. Thus, we are
interested in developing the concept of coherence in an institutional setting.
2.2 Normative Systems and Autonomous Norm Delib-
eration
As described in the introduction, norms help agents to form certain behaviour expec-
tations of their counterparts in a multiagent system, which in turn helps the system to
work efficiently. In this sense normative systems provide a very promising model for
multiagent interaction and co-ordination [4]. One of the early introductions of norms
for multiagent co-ordination is the work on artificial social systems by Tennenholtz and
colleagues [25, 19, 13]. The problem studied in artificial social systems is the design,
emergence or more generally the creation of social laws. Shoham and Tennenholtz
studied artificial social systems using notions of game theory. Continuing their work,
there has been much research in normative multiagent systems both from the social and
from the cognitive perspectives [8, 9, 31]. As our work mainly deals with the cogni-
tive aspect of norms, the following discussion focuses on proposals from a cognitive
perspective. We discuss two of the representative proposals below.
The work by Guido et al. [3] gives a comprehensive account of the situations faced
by different types of agents in which they could possibly violate norms. Situations
include: when there are contradictions between goals and obligations, when violation is
preferred to possible sanction, when an agent is ignorant about a norm or consequences
of it, or, when it is impossible to fulfil the obligation. This work also attempts to
formalise some of these notions. What relates Guido et al.’s work and ours is that all
these situations are somehow incoherent, and a coherence-driven agent can be used to
model them. However their work does not address the reasoning within the agent.
The work of Conte et al. treats norms from the cognitive perspective of individual
agents. They claim that some of the most important issues surrounding the study of
norms are how agents can acquire norms, how agents can violate norms, and how an
agent can be autonomous [9, 22]. In their work they address the issue of autonomous
norm acceptance in agents and how that is instrumental to distributed norm formation
and norm conformity in an agent society. The authors describe autonomous norm ac-
ceptance as a two step process, first recognising the norm issued by an external entity
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as a norm, and once the agent has accepted this norm, deciding to conform to it. The
first step according to the authors would form the normative belief, and the second
step would create the normative goal or intention. Moving from normative belief to
normative conformity would additionally need the existence of other private goals of
the agent which would benefit from the normative goal. The work provides a set of
rules for normative acceptance and conformity. The authors, though recognising the
importance of norm acceptance, sidestep the problem of coming up with mechanisms
for autonomous norm acceptance. That is, recognising a norm as a norm is not equiv-
alent to evaluating the norm. For an autonomous agent to accept a norm, the agent
has to understand what a norm really means and its implications in terms of its own
cognitions. And to conform to a norm it should know what actions or beliefs are per-
mitted, prohibited or obliged.In this sense our work is complementary to theirs as we
propose a mechanism for norm evaluation, which can be embedded in the process of
norm emmergence proposed by the authors.
2.3 Formalising Coherence
Here we primarily analyse those proposals that formalise coherence. The theory of co-
herence has been studied in philosophy, computer science and law, however there are
very few attempts to formalise coherence so that it could be used as a general frame-
work. However, there have been a few proposals in the field of linguistic coherence.
Hence we take two representative samples and analyse them in more detail. Both these
works concentrate on linguistic coherence which is the property of a text or conversa-
tion being semantically meaningful. However, from the formal perspectives, there are
overlaps as the principles of coherence essentially stays the same. We compare and
contrast their proposals and our work.
The work of Piwek in [21] attempts to model dialogue coherence in terms of gen-
erative systems based on natural deduction. The main argument in his work is that
it is possible to generate coherent dialogues by relying on entailment relations in the
agents knowledge base. The paper primarily deals with information seeking dialogue
where the definition of whether an agent knows a fact is equated to whether can be
logically entailed. This is an interesting way to look at dialogue coherence where the
concern here is semantic rather than structural. However, the properties of cognitive
coherence as a relation are neither exploited nor modeled. coherence in his work refers
to the meaning of coherence in a linguistic sense; i.e, what makes a text or conversa-
tion semantically meaningful whereas the coherence we deal with is a property of the
cognitive state. Though coherence is related to entailment, coherence is not equivalent
to it, and it is important to capture and model the differences.
The work of Valencia et al. [24] models agent dialogue based on the theory of
dissonance. The theory of cognitive dissonance states that contradicting cognitions
serve as a driving force that compels the mind to acquire or invent new thoughts or
beliefs, or to modify existing beliefs, so as to reduce the amount of dissonance (conflict)
between cognitions. Their work exploits the drive to reduce dissonance as a cause to
initiate a dialogue and further when this dissonance no longer persists to terminate the
dialogue. It is curious to note that many authors who have used the theory of dissonance
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in dialogue initiation and termination [20, 24] have not considered the fact that not all
incoherences are dissonance. Further, dissonance seeks out specialised information or
actions. The most important difference between the work of Valencia et al. and ours
is that, for them coherence (or the lack of it) is a local phenomena concerning only the
new arriving fact and the fact that it contradicts with, whereas for us coherence is a
global phenomena affecting the entire knowledge base of the agent. As in the case of
the previous work, the authors equate coherence with logical entailment.
2.4 Discussion
Apart from the above classification of the related work, there is a considerable amount
of interest in incorporating coherence theories in the field of legal reasoning [1, 11].
In [1], Amaya tries to apply a notion of coherence in legal justification and studies the
how notions of fairness and coherence are related. The work also claims that coherence
considerations need to be taken while putting forward an argument along with truth and
fairness considerations. In her work, Amaya analyses Thagard’s models of coherence
as constraint satisfaction and argues that such models should to be used in conducting
argument justification in legal reasoning. She has analysed different aspects of co-
herence and has studied formalised systems of coherence thoroughly. Her treatment
clarifies many conceptual issues about coherence. However, apart from suggesting and
justifying why coherence needs to be used in legal reasoning, she does not propose
neither a formalisation herself. Another work on argumentation [11]apply a coherence
based mechanism for practical reasoning systems. Thus, we see that coherence has a
diverse audience. This gives us enough reasons to go ahead with a generic formalisa-
tion which could translate these requirements into practical realisations. Specially, the
interest for coherence in the legal reasoning community confirms that coherence is a
desired property of valid arguments and hence of reasoning.
Chapter 3
Theory of Coherence
Here we introduce the theory of coherence and provide a summary of Thagard’s Theory
of Coherence, which is the major inspiration and the base of this dissertation. We
then interpret Thagard’s theory as a decision theory and contrast it with other decision
theories.
3.1 General Theory of Coherence
Some of the foundational questions in epistemology deal with the origin, structure, and
nature of knowledge and justified belief. The regress problem is an important problem
when studying the structure of how knowledge is acquired or belief is justified. One of
the central questions in the regress problem is to know how one knows or is justified
in believing some particular thing. Many epistemologists studying justification have
attempted to argue for various types of chains of reasoning that can escape the regress
problem.
1. The series is infinitely long, with every statement justified by some other state-
ment.
2. The series forms a loop, so that each statement is ultimately involved in its own
justification.
3. The series terminates with certain statements having to be self justifying.
There are two main schools of thought in answering this question, foundationalism
and coherentism. The foundationlist reject answers 1 and 2 and argue that 3 is the valid
answer. According to the foundationalist option, the series of beliefs terminates with
special justified beliefs called basic beliefs: these beliefs do not owe their justification
to any other beliefs from which they are inferred [12]. Coherentism, however, argues
that the 2nd argument is the valid one.
Coherentism rejects the argument that the regress proceeds according to a pattern
of linear justification. To avoid the charge of circularity, coherentists hold that an in-
dividual belief is justified circularly by the way it fits together (coheres) with the rest
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of the belief system of which it is a part. This theory has the advantage of avoiding
the infinite regress without claiming special, possibly arbitrary status for some partic-
ular class of beliefs. There is nothing within the definition of coherence which makes
it impossible for two entirely different sets of beliefs to be internally coherent. Thus,
there might be several such sets, and pure coherentism does not offer a solution. How-
ever later theories of coherence admits certain favorable statements whose presence in
a set makes it more coherent than other competing sets. These special statements are
some of the obvious statements (which does not need justification). This sometimes is
described as the meeting point between foundationalism and coherentism [18].
Even if one rejects the pure theory of coherence, one cannot deny the fact that, the
property of coherence is a necessary, if not a sufficient, property of a system of justified
beliefs or knowledge. This view on coherence has given raise to many applications of
the theory in the field of philosophy and psychology. Recently, computer scientists
have been increasingly taking a look at coherence and their applications in modelling
behaviour of artificial entities such as agents. Though, the theory of coherence has
been around for long, it was only recently, when the philosopher scientist Paul Thagard
proposed a model of coherence as maximisation of constraint satisfaction, that the
abstract theory of coherence became conceivable and even computable. Because this
dissertation bases its foundations on this theory, we introduce it here.
3.2 Thagard’s Theory of Coherence
Thagard postulates that coherence theory is a cognitive theory with foundations in phi-
losophy that approaches problems in terms of the satisfaction of multiple constraints
within networks of highly interconnected elements [26, 27]. Thagard takes the the-
ory from its abstract form and gives concrete interpretations of it. More importantly
Thagard attempts to extend the theories reach to a broad audience by explaining how
the theory of constraint satisfaction can be applied to problems of probabilistic reason-
ing, social consensus, emotions, and decision making in general. Though his argument
about coherence being a theory of everything is not fully convincing, he makes a strong
case for specific uses of the theory in concrete problems of decision making and prob-
abilistic reasoning.
At the interpretation level, Thagard’s theory of coherence is the study of associ-
ations, that is, how a piece of information influences another and how best different
pieces of information can be fitted together. In this regard, we can see each piece of
information as imposing a constraint on another one, the constraints being positive
or negative. Positive constraints strengthen pieces of information, thereby increasing
coherence, while negative constraints weaken them, thereby increasing incoherence.
Hence, we want to put together those pieces of information that have a positive con-
straint between them, while separating those having a negative constraint. If we man-
age to partition pieces of information in this manner, then we have satisfied all con-
straints and we have a state where coherence is maximal. The maximum coherence is
achieved when we have satisfied the maximum constraints.
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3.2.1 Thagard’s Formalisation
Thagard formalises coherence as follows: Let E be a finite set of elements {ei} and C
be a set of constraints on E understood as a subset {(ei, ej)} of pairs of elements of
E. C divides into C+, the positive constraints on E, and C−, the negative constraints
on E. With each constraint is associated a number w, which is the weight (strength) of
the constraint. Maximising coherence is formulated as the problem of partitioning E
into two sets, A (accepted) andR (rejected), in a way that maximises compliance with
the following two coherence conditions:
1. if (ei, ej) is in C+ then ei is in A if and only if ej is in A.
2. if (ei, ej) is in C−, then ei is in A if and only if ej is inR.
If (ei, ej) ∈ C, then, Thagard defines it as a satisfied constraint. IfW be the weight of
the partition, that is, the sum of the weights of the satisfied constraints. The coherence
problem is then to partition E into A and R in a way that maximises W . Because a
coheres with b is a symmetric relation, the order of the elements in the constraints does
not matter.
By itself, this characterisation has no philosophical or psychological or probabilis-
tic reasoning applications, because it does not state the nature of the elements, the
nature of the constraints, or the algorithms to be used to maximise satisfaction of the
constraints.However, Thagard further proposes that there are six main kinds of coher-
ence: explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative, each
with its own array of elements and constraints. Once these elements and constraints are
specified, then the algorithms that solve the general coherence problem can be used to
compute coherence in ways that apply specific domain problems.
3.2.2 Computing Coherence
Since the coherence problem is formalised as a constraint satisfaction problem, he
further argues that there should be many algorithms to compute coherence. i.e. we can
solve the problem of selecting elements that can be accepted or rejected in a way that
maximises compliance with the two coherence conditions on constraint satisfaction.
He goes on to give five specific algorithms with increasing degrees of complexity and
effectiveness. They are as given below:
1. an exhaustive search algorithm that considers all possible solutions;
2. an incremental algorithm that considers elements in arbitrary order;
3. a connectionist algorithm that uses an artificial neural network to assess coher-
ence;
4. a greedy algorithm that uses locally optimal choices to approximate a globally
optimal solution;
5. a semidefinite programming (SDP) algorithm that is guaranteed to satisfy a high
proportion of the maximum satisfiable constraints.
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Thagard has experimented with many computational implementations of coherence.
ECHO is a computational model of explanatory coherence which uses a connectionist
algorithm. Though there are no guarantee that such neural network models for co-
herence would converge to a coherence maximising partition, he claims that on small
networks it has been shown to give good results.
Thus, Thagard proposes the first major concrete account of coherence, which takes
us from the abstract notion of coherence to a a computational phenomena which can
be evaluated. One of the main drawback of his theory is that, he stops with giving
certain principles about calculating values of coherence constraints for different types
of coherence. However, to compute these values, one needs to have concrete functions
with proven properties. This dissertation is mainly an attempt in this direction, while
also attempting to solve problems in normative multiagent systems.
3.3 Comparison with Other Decision Theories
Keeping Thagard’s approach to coherence as maximising constraint satisfaction, we
try to understand the main concept behind this theory. We associate coherence with an
ever-changing system where coherence is the only property that is preserved, while ev-
erything around it changes. That is, everything else is picked and chosen to maximise
coherence. In cognitive terms, this would mean that, there are no beliefs nor other cog-
nitions that are taken for granted or fixed forever. Everything can be changed and may
be changed to keep coherence. We humans tend to revise or re-evaluate adherence to
social norms, our plans, goals and even beliefs when we are faced with incoherence.
For most researchers of agent theory and multiagent systems, however, changing be-
liefs in this way is equivalent to creating agents that are not dependable. However we
argue that taking decisions based on coherence does not imply an unstable system. Our
claim is based on the fact that some beliefs are more fundamental than others. Such
fundamental beliefs define a personality, and revision of a fundamental belief is less
frequent compared to other beliefs. In coherence terms, these beliefs are fundamen-
tal because they support and get support from most other cognitions and hence are in
positive coherence with them. Hence, such beliefs will almost always be part of the
chosen set while maximising coherence. The same is the case with other cognitions.
Those that are normally in positive coherence with most other, will almost always be
selected with coherence maximisation, while this process also helps us resolve conflicts
by selecting the best alternatives.
When applied to decision making, this means, we not only select the set of actions
to be performed to achieve certain fixed goals, but we also look for the best set of goals
to be pursued. Further, since coherence affects everything from beliefs to goals and
actions, it may happen that beliefs contradicting a decision made are discarded. There
are psychological theories such as cognitive dissonance that explain this phenomenon
as an attempt to justify the action chosen. Thus, with coherence we are looking at a
more dynamic model of cognitions where one picks and choses goals, actions and even
beliefs to fit a grand plan of maximising coherence.
This view of decision making is very different from those of classical decision
making theories. The fundamental notion of classical decision theories is the notion
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of preference. The notion of utility is derived from the notion of preference in such
a way that x is preferred to y if and only if x has a greater utility than y. Then, the
decision making process is equated to the maximisation of utilities. However, pref-
erences are atomic, and there is no conceptual understanding of how preferences are
formed. In the theory of coherence, we precisely aim at understanding preferences.
The assumption here is more basic because the only knowledge available to us are the
various interacting constraints between pieces of information. The process of coher-
ence maximisation helps one to form the set of preferences from the available complex
network of constraints. Further, coherence-based decision making unlike other multi-
attribute decision making processes, works with a dynamic system where everything
from beliefs to goals and actions are subject to be selected or discarded. In other the-
ories decision making is more about action selection for a pre-established set of goals
based on a pre-established set of criteria.
In this dissertation we discuss how an agent can reason about social norms to aid
in decision making, especially when there are conflicts among its cognitions and the
norms. However, we attempt to address the more fundamental problem of agent au-
tonomy, and propose a general coherence-based framework that, among other things,
helps an agent to reason autonomously about its adherence to social norms, its own
goals and beliefs. In this way, we are proposing an extension or an alternative notion
of an agent theory where coherence is the fundamental aspect of the agent’s cognition
which it tries to preserve, and beliefs, goals, intentions and other social dimensions are
adjusted to preserve coherence.
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Chapter 4
A Coherence Framework
In this chapter, we introduce our generic coherence framework together with those
computable functions that will allow us to build coherence-based agents (see Section
5). Our framework is based on Thagard’s formulation of the theory of coherence as
maximising constraint satisfaction. The theory of coherence is based on the underlying
assumption that pieces of information can be associated with each other, the association
being either positive or negative. Since we are interested in studying these associations,
we use graphs with nodes and edges to model these associations. Here we differ from
other approaches in extending agent theories [6, 20] as we rethink the way an agent
framework is perceived by making the associations in the cognitions explicit in repre-
sentation and analysis. That is, we introduce coherence as a fundamental property of
the cognition of an agent. In the following definitions, we introduce coherence graphs,
the various computable functions to determine the coherence of such graphs, and how
the coherence of a given graph can be maximised.
4.1 Coherence Graphs
The nodes in a coherence graph represent the pieces of information for which we want
to estimate coherence. Examples of such pieces of information are atomic propositions
(or complex formulae) and atomic concepts (or their combinations). Nodes have a
degree represented by a function ρ. This function indicates a confidence associated
with the piece of information. For example, if the piece of information is a belief
proposition of a BDI agent then the value of ρ for that piece of information indicates
the degree to which the agent believes in the proposition.
Finally, edges between nodes may be associated with a strength, represented by
a function ζ, which is derived from the underlying relation between the pieces of in-
formation. That is, if two pieces of information are related through an explanation,
for instance, then the function ζ assigns a positive strength to the edge connecting
those pieces of information. Thagard in his characterisation classifies coherence into
different types such as explanatory, deductive, perceptual, conceptual, analogous and
deliberative coherence depending on this underlying relation. Thus, we have different
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ζ functions for different types of coherence. The value of the function ζ, that is, the
strength on an edge, may be negative or positive. Note that a zero strength on an edge,
implies that the two pieces of information are unrelated, which is equivalent to not hav-
ing the edge connecting the pieces of information. Hence we only consider nonzero
strength values on edges. A guideline for defining ζ is Thagard’s guiding principles for
each type of coherence, which we will elaborate in Section 5 for deductive coherence.
We consider a running example as in Figure 4.1, which will help us to illustrate the
concepts as we define them. The graph in the example is constructed with one of the
inference rules of the propositional calculus, namely Modus Tollens: (α → β),¬β `
¬α. As we gradually build our framework, we also add more sophistication to our
coherence graph in this example.
α,0.4
β,0.3
α➝β,0.8 ¬β,0.9
¬α,0.8
1/2 -1
-1
1/2
ν₁
ν₃
ν₂
ν₄
ν₅
Figure 4.1: Graph representing the coherence and incoherence relations between
graded propositions related through Modus Tollens: (α→ β),¬β ` ¬α
Thus a coherence graph is defined as follows:
Definition 1 A coherence graph is a graph g = 〈V,E, ρ, ζ〉, where
1. V is a finite set of nodes representing pieces of information.
2. E is a finite set of subsets of 2 elements of V representing the coherence and
incoherence between pieces of information.
3. ρ : V → [0, 1] is a function that maps each node to a weight representing grades
(confidence) on the corresponding pieces of information.
4. ζ : E → [−1, 1]\{0} is a function that assigns a value to the coherence between
concepts, and which we shall call a coherence function1.
Let G denote the set of all possible coherence graphs.
Figure 4.1 is an example of a coherence graph as defined above with the following
values.
1We write indistinguishably ζ(v, w) or ζ(w, v) for ζ({v, w})
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• V = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5}
• E = {{v1, v2}, {v3, v2}, {v2, v4}, {v3, v5}}
• ρ(v1) = 0.8, ρ(v2) = 0.8, . . .
• ζ(v1, v2) = 0.5, ζ(v2, v4) = −1, . . .
4.2 Calculating Coherence
According to coherence theory, if a piece of information is chosen as accepted (or de-
clared true), pieces of information contradicting it are most likely rejected (or declared
false) while those supporting it and getting support from it are most likely accepted (or
declared true). The important problem is not to find a piece of information that gets
accepted, but to know whether more than one piece of information or a set of them
can be accepted together. Hence, the coherence problem is to partition the nodes of
a coherence graph into two sets (accepted A, and rejected V \ A) in such a way as
to maximise the satisfaction of constraints. A positive constraint between two nodes is
said to be satisfied if both nodes are either in the accepted set or both in the rejected set.
Similarly, a negative constraint is satisfied if one of them is in the accepted set while
the other is in the rejected set. We express these formally in the following definitions.
Definition 2 Given a coherence graph g = 〈V,E, ρ, ζ〉, and a partition (A, V \ A) of
V , the set of satisfied constraints CA ⊆ E is given by
CA =
{
{v, w} ∈ E
∣∣∣∣ v ∈ A iff w ∈ A, when ζ(v, w) > 0v ∈ A iff w 6∈ A, when ζ(v, w) < 0
}
All other constraints (in E \ CA) are said to be unsatisfied.
To illustrate this, consider the partition (A1, V \ A1) as in Figure 4.2. We see
that, given this partition, the only satisfied constraints are those between {v1, v2} and
between {v2, v4}.
Now we define both the accepted set in the partition that maximises the satisfaction
of constraints and the actual value of coherence corresponding to this partition. We
define first the strength of a partition as the sum over the strengths of all the satisfied
constraints (ζ values) corresponding to that partition, multiplied by the degrees (the ρ
values) of the nodes connected by the edge. Then the coherence of a graph is defined
to be the maximum among the total strengths when calculated over all its partitions.
We have the following definitions:
Definition 3 Given a coherence graph g = 〈V,E, ρ, ζ〉, the strength of a partition
(A, V \ A) of V is given by
σ(g,A) =
∑
{v,w}∈CA | ζ(v, w) | · ρ(v) · ρ(w)
| E | (4.1)
For the partition in Figure 4.2, its strength is 0.16.
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α,0.4
β,0.3
α➝β,0.8
¬β,0.9
¬α,0.8
1/2 -1
-1
1/2
unsatisfied 
constraints
satisfied 
constraints
A₁ V \ A₁
ν₁
ν₂
ν₄
ν₅
ν₃
Figure 4.2: The strength of partition (A1, V \ A1) is 0.16
Definition 4 Given a coherence graph g = 〈V,E, ρ, ζ〉 and given the strength σ(g,A)
for all subsets A of V , the coherence of g is given by
κ(g) = max
A⊆V
σ(g,A) (4.2)
If for some partition (A, V \ A) of V , the coherence is maximum, that is, κ(g) =
σ(g,A), then the set A is called the accepted set and V \ A the rejected set of this
partition.
An important property of coherence maximisation is that, the accepted set A is not
unique. This is due to the fact that the partitions (A, V \ A) and its dual (V \ A,A)
are coherence maximising partitions. Hence, whenever A is a coherence maximising
accepted set, so is V \ A. Moreover there could be other partitions that generate the
same value for κ(g). In choosing the preferred accepted set A from the set of accepted
sets, we go back to the theory of coherence and principles set by Thagard.
Thagard’s Principle 3 (more discussion on these principles are in Section 5) states
that Propositions that are intuitively obvious have a degree of acceptability on their
own. These obvious propositions are in many cases the evidences or the known facts
available to us. Hence, we can choose our accepted set to be the one which includes
these obvious propositions. However, one can argue that this does not guarantee
uniqueness. Another factor to differentiate the accepted sets is the coherence of the
sub-graphs restricted to the accepted sets i.e., g|A. The coherence of the sub-graphs
gives us an indication of how strongly connected they are. The higher the coherence,
the better connected the pieces of information within the sub-graph. Hence, we should
prefer an accepted set corresponding to the sub-graph with a higher coherence to that of
a subgraph with a lower coherence. Yet another factor to distinguish the accepted sets
are the number of nodes in each set. We should prefer those sets with more nodes as we
are interested in eliminating the minimum number of problematic nodes that reduces
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our coherence, while trying to retain all that is possible in the accepted set. Apart from
these criteria, the solution to preferring one accepted set over another depends on the
decision making agent, which can prefer one set to another for independent reasons.
α,0.4
β,0.3
α➝β,0.8
¬β,0.9
¬α,0.8
1/2 -1
-1
1/2
ν₁
ν₂
ν₄
ν₅
ν₃
Figure 4.3: Coherence of the graph is 0.3175 (for the partition (A, V \ A) )
For the example in Figure 4.1, we have a coherence maximising partition (A, V \A)
as in Figure 4.3. With this partition we see that all the constraints are satisfied and this
partition gives the maximum strength for the graph.
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Chapter 5
Formalising Coherence: A
Proof-Theoretical Approach
So far we have introduced the general computable functions of our coherence frame-
work, under the assumption that a coherence graph already exists. For this framework
to be fully computational, it is necessary to define how a coherence graph can be con-
structed. That is, given a set of pieces of information and their associated confidence
degrees, we need to define a coherence function ζ relating them. As the nature of rela-
tionship between two pieces of information can vary greatly, we do not have one unique
coherence function. Thagard in his characterisation of coherence defines different types
of coherence based on the type of pieces of information and their relationships. Fur-
ther, in each of of these types, only the corresponding relationship is evaluated. That is,
in an explanatory coherence, two pieces of information are coherent only if they are re-
lated by an explanation. Thagard proposes certain principles to characterise coherence
in each of the different types.
Here we study one such coherence, namely deductive coherence, and define a de-
ductive coherence function which captures the deductive relationship between propo-
sitions. Since logical deduction has a sound theoretical basis, and has well defined
rules, we choose deductive coherence among the different types of coherence to start
with a formalisation of coherence. We first derive a deductive coherence function in
adherence with Thagard’s principles and later analyse this function in the context of
structural and internal connectives. The latter helps us to further derive coherence val-
ues between those pieces of information that are not directly related by deduction.
Thagard introduces in [26] the notion of deductive coherence by means of a set of
principles:
1. Deductive coherence is a symmetric relation.
2. A proposition coheres with propositions that are deducible from it.
3. Propositions that together are used to deduce some other proposition cohere with
each other.
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4. The more hypotheses it takes to deduce something, the less the degree of coher-
ence.
5. Contradictory propositions are incoherent with each other.
6. Propositions that are intuitively obvious have a degree of acceptability on their
own.
7. The acceptability of a proposition in a system of propositions depends on its
coherence with them.
In this section we give a proof-theoretical formalisation of the notion of deductive co-
herence inspired by the principles put forth by Thagard. We base our coherence func-
tion on multiset deductive relations. The concept of a multiset is a generalisation of the
concept of a set. Intuitively speaking, we can regard a multiset as a set in which the
number of times each element occurs is significant, but not the order of the elements.
The introduction of multisets in our framework will allow us to deal more adequately
with logics as linear logics, relevance logics or multi-valued logics. We denote a “mul-
tiset deductive relation” as MDR. We assume that all MDRs we deal with are finitary
and decidable. These MDRs are often called simple consequence relations [2]. We
define an MDR as follows:
Definition 5 Given a logical language L, a multiset deductive relation (MDR) on a set
of formulas of L, is a binary relation ` between finite multisets of formulas of L such
that, for all Γ1,Γ2,Σ1,Σ2 ⊆ L and for all γ ∈ L:
1. Reflexivity: γ ` γ, for every formula γ
2. Transitivity: if Γ1 ` Σ1, γ and γ,Γ2 ` Σ2, then Γ1,Γ2 ` Σ1,Σ2.
As usual in sequent calculi, we denote by ` β the fact that β can be deduced
from the empty multiset, and we denote by Γ ` the fact that the multiset Γ has as
consequence the empty multiset. For example, in case that L is classical propositional
logic, ` β means that β is a tautology and Γ `means that the multiset Γ is inconsistent.
5.1 Coherence Functions
We approach the formalisation of deductive coherence by first deriving a coherence
function from an MDR. We use Thagard’s principles to relate an MDR and the coher-
ence function ζ. The intuition behind these principles is that whenever two propositions
are related by a deductive relation, then there exists a positive coherence between them,
the degree of the coherence being inversely proportional to the number of propositions
involved in the deduction (Principle 4). If they form a contradiction, then there is a
negative coherence between them. However we do not model Principle 3 (propositions
that together are used to deduce some other proposition cohere with each other). Prin-
ciple 3, if taken into account, can mean that all propositions cohere with each other.
This is due to certain straightforward deductions such as α, β ` α ∧ β. We imagine
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that, Thagard, however, had certain specific relationships in mind, such as in cases
where premises are implications of one another in the context of the conclusion. These
in general are captured by principle 2.
We formalise Thagard’s principles in terms of a support function η on the MDR as
below.
Definition 6 Let ` be an MDR and T a finite set of formulas of a language L. A
support function is a partial function η : T × T → IN ∪ {−1} given by
η(α, β) =

|Γ|+ 1 if Γ ⊆ T is the smallest set, such that Γ, α ` β, and
Γ, α 6` and Γ 6` β
1 if ` β and α 6`
−1 if α, β `
undefined otherwise
In our example, we have (α→ β),¬β ` ¬α. That is, there are two premises α→
β and ¬β required to derive ¬α. Therefore, the value of the support function between
each of the premises and the conclusion is 2. That is, η(α→ β,¬α) = η(¬β,¬α) = 2.
Observe that, for any given MDR, the support function η satisfies the following:
• If α ` β, then η(α, β) = 1.
• If η(γ, α) = 1 and η(α, β) = 1, then η(γ, β) = 1.
• In general, if η(γ, α) = n+ 1 and η(α, β) = m+ 1 with n,m ∈ IN , then
max (n,m) + 1 ≤ η(γ, β) ≤ n+m+ 1.
We now define the deductive coherence between two propositions as the value of
the stronger relation since deductive coherence is a symmetric function. Due to this,
even if there may only be a deductive relation in one direction, there will be a deductive
coherence in both directions. The value of deductive coherence is the inverse value
given by the support function. Note that both the support function and the deductive
coherence function are partial functions. This is because we interpret zero coherence
as the propositions not being related.
Definition 7 Let ` be an MDR, T a finite set of formulas of a languageL, η : T ×T →
IN ∪ {−1} be a support function, A deductive coherence function is a partial function
ζ : T × T → [−1, 1] \ {0} given by:
For any pair (α, β) of formulas in T , a coherence function ζ is a partial function
with
ζ(α, β) =

1/min(η(α, β), η(β, α)) if both η(α, β) and η(β, α) are defined
1/η(α, β) if η(α, β) is defined and η(β, α) undefined
1/η(β, α) if η(β, α) is defined and η(α, β) undefined
undefined otherwise
In our example (Figure 4.1), since we have η(α → β,¬α) = η(¬β,¬α) = 2, and
since these are the only deduction relations between these formulas, we have ζ(α →
β,¬α) = ζ(¬β,¬α) = 1/2. Similarly, since η(α,¬α) = η(β,¬β) = −1, we also
have ζ(α,¬α) = η(β,¬β) = −1.
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Proposition 5.1.1 A deductive coherence function ζ satisfies Thagards’s principles ex-
cept for principle 3.
Proof
Principle1 : ζ is symmetric by construction.
Principle 2 : If |Γ| = n and Γ, α ` β then η(α, β) = n+ 1 and ζ(α, β) = 1/(n+ 1).
Principle 4 : If |Γ1| = n and |Γ2| = m, n < m and Γ1, α1 ` β and Γ2, α2 ` β then
ζ(α1, β) = 1/(n+ 1) > ζ(α2, β) = 1/(m+ 1).
Principle 5 : Satisfied by construction.
Principle 6 : Propositions that are intuitively obvious are the axioms. That is, if ` β is an
axiom, then for every α 6`, we have ζ(α, β) = 1. That is, β coheres with every
other proposition with the highest coherence. Hence β has an intuitive priority.
Principle 7 : Satisfied by the definition 4.2.
Note that deductive relations are not symmetric but are transitive in general. How-
ever coherence functions differ by not being transitive in general. This is due to the
symmetric property of a coherence function. That is, a deductive relation in a single
direction gives raise to a coherence function in both directions. However, if we exclude
certain special cases, we can show that coherence functions are transitive.
Proposition 5.1.2 Whenever α, β, γ 6` and 6` α, 6` β, 6` γ,
C(γ, α) = 1 and C(α, β) = 1, then C(γ, β) = 1
except for the two following cases for non-equivalent formulas:
• γ ` α and β ` α
• α ` γ and α ` β
5.2 Properties of Coherence Based On MDRs
We can classify logics according to structural rules (such as weakening /monotonic-
ity) and connectives available in it. There are two types of connectives: the internal
connectives, which transform a given sequent into an equivalent one that has a special
required form, and the combining connectives, which combine two sequents into one.
For instance, classical propositional logic is monotonic, satisfies weakening, has the
internal and combining connectives, and makes no difference between the combining
and the corresponding internal connectives. On the other hand, propositional linear
logic is nonmonotonic, has the above connectives but distinguishes between internal
and combining ones. Intuitionistic logic differs from classical propositional logic in its
implication connective and does not contain any internal negation. In this section, we
explore the properties of the deductive coherence function ζ which would help deter-
mine the value of function ζ between pairs of formulas which are related through some
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of the structural rules and connectives. We do this by identifying the properties of the
support function η using the properties of the connectives and structural rules.
By Definition 6, the function η is defined for formulas related through an MDR in
the form Γ, α ` β. Hence we express the deduction relation in this single-conclusioned
form so that we can find properties of function η between different formulas of the
premises and conclusion, using the properties of the connectives.
5.2.1 Combining Conjunction
Conjunctive ∧ is combining iff, for all Γ,Σ ⊆ L and α, β ∈ L:
Γ ` Σ, α ∧ β iff Γ ` Σ, α and Γ ` Σ, β
Consequently, for all Γ ⊆ L and α, β, γ ∈ L and n,m ≥ 0
1. Given that Γ, γ ` α ∧ β implies Γ, γ ` α and Γ, γ ` β, we have that
if η(γ, α ∧ β) = n+ 1 then 0 < η(γ, α) ≤ n+ 1 and 0 < η(γ, β) ≤ n+ 1.
2. Given Γ, γ ` α and Γ, γ ` β implies Γ, γ ` α ∧ β, and ` satisfies weakening,
then we have that
if η(γ, α) = n+ 1 and η(γ, β) = m+ 1 then max(n,m) + 1 ≤ η(γ, α ∧ β) ≤
n+m+ 1
3. Given α, β 6` then we have that
η(α ∧ β, α) = 1 and η(α ∧ β, β) = 1
5.2.2 Internal Conjunction
Conjunction ◦ is internal iff, for all Γ,Σ ⊆ L and α, β ∈ L:
Γ, α, β ` Σ iff Γ, α ◦ β ` Σ
Consequently, for all Γ ⊆ L and α, β, σ ∈ L and n,m ≥ 0
1. Given that Γ, α ◦ β ` σ implies Γ, α, β ` σ
if η(α ◦ β, σ) = n+ 1 implies 0 < η(α, σ) ≤ n+ 2 and 0 < η(β, σ) ≤ n+ 2
2. Given that Γ, α, β ` σ implies Γ, α ◦ β ` σ and that ` satisfies weakening, we
have that
if η(α, σ) = n+1 and η(β, σ) = m+1 impliesmax(n,m)+1 ≤ η(α◦β, γ) ≤
n+m+ 1
3. Given that α, β ` iff α ◦ β `, then we have that
if η(α, β) = −1 then, for all γ ∈ L we have η(γ, α ◦ β) = −1
4. Given α, β 6` then we have that
η(α, α ◦ β) = 2 and η(β, α ◦ β) = 2
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5.2.3 Combining Disjunction
Disjunction ∨ is combining iff, for all Γ,Σ ⊆ L and α, β ∈ L:
Γ, α ∨ β ` Σ iff Γ, α ` Σ and Γ, β ` Σ
Consequently, for all Γ ⊆ L and α, β, σ ∈ L and n,m ≥ 0
1. Given that Γ, α ∨ β ` σ implies Γ, α ` σ and Γ, β ` σ, we have that
if η(α ∨ β, σ) = n+ 1 then 0 < η(α, σ) ≤ n+ 1 and 0 < η(β, σ) ≤ n+ 1
2. Given that Γ, α ` σ and Γ, β ` σ implies Γ, α ∨ β ` σ and that ` satisfies
weakening, we have that
if η(α, σ) = n+ 1 and η(β, σ) = m+ 1 thenmax(n,m) + 1 ≤ η(α ∨ β, σ) ≤
n+m+ 1
3. Given that γ, α ∨ β ` iff γ, α ` and γ, β `, then we have that
if η(γ, α ∨ β) = −1 iff η(γ, α) = −1 and η(γ, β) = −1
4. Given α, β 6` then we have that
η(α, α ∨ β) = 1 and η(β, α ◦ β) = 1
5.2.4 Internal Disjunction
Disjunction + is internal iff, for all Γ,Σ ⊆ L and α, β ∈ L we have:
Γ ` Σ, α, β iff Γ ` Σ, α+ β
Consequently, for all Γ ⊆ L and α, β, γ ∈ L and n,m ≥ 0
1. Given that Γ, γ ` α + β implies Γ, γ ` α, β and that ` satisfies weakening, we
have that
if η(γ, α) = n+ 1 and η(γ, β) = m+ 1 then η(γ, α+ β) = min(n,m) + 1
if η(γ, α) = n+ 1 and if η(γ, β) undefined, then η(γ, α+ β) = n+ 1
2. Given α, β 6` and that ` satisfies weakening, then we have that
η(α, α+ β) = 1 and η(β, α+ β) = 1
5.2.5 Combining Implication
Implication ⊃ is combining iff for all Γ,Σ ⊆ L and α, β ∈ L we have:
Γ, α ⊃ β ` Σ iff Γ ` Σ, α and Γ, β ` Σ.
Consequently, for all Γ ∈ L and α, β, σ ∈ L and n,m ≥ 0
1. Given that Γ, α ⊃ β ` σ implies Γ, β ` σ we have that
if η(α ⊃ β, σ) = n+ 1 then η(β, σ) = n+ 1
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2. Given that γ, α ⊃ β ` iff γ ` α and γ, β `, we have that
if η(γ, α ⊃ β) = −1 iff η(γ, α) = 1 and η(γ, β) = −1
3. Given α, β 6` then we have that
η(β, α ⊃ β) = 1
and if ` satisfies weakening, then we have that
η(α, β) = 1 and η(α ⊃ β, β) = 1
5.2.6 Internal Implication
Implication→ is internal iff for all Γ,Σ ⊆ L and α, β ∈ L we have
Γ, α ` Σ, β iff Γ ` Σ, α→ β
Consequently, for all Γ ∈ L and α, β, γ ∈ L and n,m ≥ 0
1. Given that Γ, γ, α ` β iff Γ, γ ` α→ β, we have that
if η(γ, α→ β) = n+ 1 then 0 < η(γ, β) ≤ n+ 2
if η(γ, β) = n+ 2 then 0 < η(γ, α→ β) ≤ n+ 1
2. Given α, β 6` we have that
η(α→ β, β) = 2
5.2.7 Internal Negation
Negation is internal iff, for all Γ,Σ ⊆ L,α ∈ L we have:
Γ, α ` Σ iff Γ ` Σ,¬α
Consequently, for all Γ ⊆ L and α, γ ∈ L
1. if α 6` and 6` α and given that γ, α ` iff γ ` ¬α, we have that,
η(γ, α) = −1 iff η(γ,¬α) = 1
2. η(¬α, α) = −1
An interesting point to note is that, most properties we have listed in this section
hold universally, however, a few properties need that the deduction relation satisfies
weakening. This has a special significance for deductive coherence as the principles of
deductive coherence indirectly assumes the absence of weakening. That is, two propo-
sitions are related by deductive coherence only if one of them contributes in deriving
the other. When weakening is introduced, this constraint no longer holds. Hence co-
herence is more closer in structure to non-classical logics such as relevant logic where
the antecedent needs to be necessarily relevant to the consequent.
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5.3 An Example
So far we have analysed formally the properties of coherence by listing the properties
of the support function in terms of the connectives and structural properties of a logic.
Here we apply these properties in the context of classical logic to deduce some of the
coherence values. We use the same example as in the previous sections. We enrich
the example by adding another proposition γ. This is because of the fact that, the
more interesting properties of the support function are derived between distinguished
elements and non-distinguished elements. We also add an implication namely γ `
α → β. Then using the axioms we have derived so far, we can deduce the following
coherence values. Since in the example we only have implications and negations, we
use only the axioms related to implication and negation. It is however easy to see
how we can similarly apply the results of other connectives in appropriate cases. The
purpose of this example is only to demonstrate that coherence graphs can be enriched
with these properties of coherence, however, we do not intend to be exhaustive.
1. ζ(β, α→ β) = 1/2 using Property 2 (Internal Implication).
2. ζ(β, γ) = 1/2 using Property 1 and Property 2 (Internal Implication).
α, 0.4
¬β, 0.9β, 0.3γ, 0.8
¬ α,0.8α → β, 0.8
-1
1/2
1/2
1 1/2
4
3
2
1
56
Figure 5.1: Applying properties of η to compute coherence values
Chapter 6
An Architecture for
Coherence-Driven Agents
In this chapter we describe an architecture for coherence-driven agents based on the
coherence framework developed so far. A coherence-driven agent is an agent which
always takes an action based on maximisation of its coherence. We further consider
cognitive agents such as those based on the BDI theory, since it is one of the prominent
existing agent architectures. We use an adaptation of the architecture developed by
Casali et al. [7] based on multi-context systems (MCS), which incorporates graded
cognitions. The grade in a cognition represents the degree to which an agent believes
(desires or intents) a particular cognition. We use graded cognitions to incorporate
reasoning under uncertainty into our agent framework. Then, an MCS models the
representation and interaction between these graded cognitions.
In the work of Casali et al., the MCS specification of an agent contains three basic
components: units or contexts, logics, and bridge rules, which channel the propagation
of consequences among the contexts. Contexts in a multi-context BDI are the mental
contexts of beliefs, desires, and intentions. The deduction mechanism of MCS is based
on two kinds of inference rules, internal rules ∆i inside each context, and bridge rules
B between contexts. Internal rules allow an agent to draw consequences within a con-
text, while bridge rules allow to embed results from one context into another [14, 15].
Thus, an agent is defined as a family of interconnected contexts:〈{Ci}i∈I , B〉
where
- each context Ci = 〈Li, Ai,∆i〉 consists of
– Li are languages
– Ai are axioms
– ∆i are deduction rules
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- B of inference rules with premises and conclusions in different contexts.
For instance:
1 : ψ, 2 : ϕ
3 : φ
represents that if formula ψ is deduced in context C1 and formula ϕ is deduced
in context C2 then formula φ is inferred in context C3.
The multi-context architecture is adapted here so that we have further structure in
the form of coherence graphs, associated with each of our contexts. Our bridge rules
carry deductions from one graph to another. As we need the specific coherence graphs
to define our multi-context architecture, we first define those specific coherence graphs
which are of interest to us. We also need an adaptation of the bridge rules to carry
deductions across graphs. After defining these necessary elements, we discuss the
agent architecture itself.
6.1 Cognitive and Norm Coherence graphs
Given the general definition of a coherence graph and its restriction into a deductive
coherence graph in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we here discuss certain specific coher-
ence graphs, the belief, desire, intention, and norm coherence graphs of an agent. The
graphs will be deductive coherence graphs, since so far we have only defined a de-
ductive coherence function. Further, the nodes of the graph will be elements of logics
corresponding to cognitions. Hence, we first define the underlying logic, and later de-
fine the graph over this logic. These logics are defined as in Casali et.al. We briefly
describe the belief logic below, for a detailed discussion on desire and intention logics,
we refer to [7].
In order to define a belief graph, we need to first define a belief logic KB =
〈LB , AB ,`B〉. We define the belief language LB by extending the classical propo-
sitional language L defined upon a countable set of propositional variables PV and
connectives (¬,→). We extend L with a fuzzy unary modal operator B. The modal
language LB is built from the elementary modal formulae Bϕ where ϕ is proposi-
tional, and truth constants r, for each rational r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], using the connectives of
Łukasiewicz many-valued logic. If ϕ is a proposition in L, the intended meaning of
Bϕ is that “ϕ is believable”. We use a modal many-valued logic based on Łukasiewicz
logic to formalise KB1. Formally the belief language LB is defined as:
Definition 8 Given a propositional language L, a belief language LB is given by:
• if ϕ ∈ L, and r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] then (Bϕ, r) ∈ LB
• if ϕ,ψ ∈ LB then ϕ →L ψ ∈ LB and ϕ & ψ ∈ LB (where & and →L
correspond to the conjunction and implication of Łukasiewicz logic)
• if ϕ ∈ L then ¬Lϕ ∈ LB
1We could use other logics as well by replacing the axioms.
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The axioms AB of KB are:
1. All axioms of propositional logic.
2. Axioms of Łukasiewicz logic for modal formulas (for instance, axioms of
Ha´jek’s Basic Logic (BL) [16] plus the axiom: ¬¬Φ→ Φ.)
3. Probabilistic axioms, given ϕ,ψ ∈ L :
• B(ϕ→ ψ)→L (Bϕ→ Bψ)
• Bϕ ≡ ¬LB(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→L B(ϕ ∧ ψ)
• ¬LBϕ ≡ B¬ϕ.
The deduction rules defining `B of KB are:
1. Modus ponens.
2. Necessitation for B (from ϕ derive Bϕ).
A belief graph over the belief logic KB is then defined as follows:
Definition 9 Given a belief logicKB = 〈LB , AB ,`B〉 where LB is a belief language,
AB are a set of axioms and `B are a set of deduction rules, a belief graph gB =
〈VB , EB , ρB , ζB〉 is a coherence graph defined over `B and a finite set TB ⊆ LB of
formulas such that:
• VB ⊆ TB
• E is a set of subsets of 2 elements of VB
• ρB : VB → [0, 1] is defined by means of the truth-functions of Łukasiewicz logic
and the probabilistic interpretation of beliefs as follows:
– ρ(Bϕ, r) = r for all r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]
– ρ(ϕ & ψ) = max(ρ(ϕ) + ρ(ψ)− 1, 0) for all ϕ,ψ ∈ LB
– ρ(ϕ→L ψ) = min(1− ρ(ϕ) + ρ(ψ), 1) for all ϕ,ψ ∈ LB
• ζB is the deductive coherence function defined over `B and TB .
Let GB denote the set of all belief coherence graphs.
A belief graph exclusively represents the graded beliefs of an agent and the associations
among them. A desire graph (gD), and an intention graph (gI ) over given logics LD,
and LI respectively would be similarly defined. (Analogously the set of all desire, and
intention graphs are GD, and GI respectively.)
32 CHAPTER 6. AN ARCHITECTURE FOR COHERENCE-DRIVEN AGENTS
6.1.1 Norm Graph (gN )
The normative behaviour in a normative multiagent system is generally described by
using deontic constraints, such as obligations, permissions and prohibitions. Just as
we have graded cognitions for an agent, our norms also come with grades. Grades in
general add more richness to the semantics, and, in particular for the case of norms,
the grades help understand the relative importance of a norm within a system of norms.
A graded norm is interpreted in terms of its priority, measured in terms of the value
it generates in a normative multiagent system. This value can be determined by the
the social goals it helps in achieving. However, there could be other measures for
determining priority of a norm.
In order to define a norm graph, we need to first define a norm logic KN =
〈LN , AN ,`N 〉. As we have graded norms, we define KN as a graded deontic logic
namely the Probability-valued Deontic Logic [10] to represent and reason with norms.
We define the norm language LN by extending the classical propositional language L
defined upon a countable set of propositional variables and connectives (¬,→). LN is
defined as a fuzzy modal language over Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) to reason about
the probability degree of deontic propositions. In our case the probability values are re-
placed by the grades associated with the norms. The language, axioms and deductions
rules are defined similarly as in the case of the belief logic. For the details, refer [10].
Here we list some of the examples of valid norms in PSDL. Below we use triples
form for propositional formulas. (The triples in the examples are self explanatory).
• (〈John, use, publictransport〉 → O〈John, validate, ticket〉, 0.8)
If John uses public transport, then John is obliged to validate the ticket.
• (〈Anna, citizen, Utopia〉 → O〈Anna, pay tax, Utopia〉, 1)
If Anna is a citizen of Utopia, then Anna ought to pay tax to Utopia.
6.2 Graph Composition
From our construction so far, a coherence-driven agent will only have separate graphs
corresponding to each of its cognitions and to the norm of the different normative
systems. Though it is useful to reason within each of the individual cognitions and
normative systems, what is more interesting is to be able to reason with all cognitions
and norms put together. For instance, it is desirable to know the most coherent set of
beliefs, desires, intentions and norms, or to choose the best set of norms and intentions
given a set of beliefs and desires. In summary, it will be useful for an agent to reason
by taking into account the influence of all its cognitions and external entities such as
norms. If an agent is capable of determining the coherence graph of all its cognitions
and norms, then the coherence maximising partition for that graph would for instance,
tell the agent, which of its intentions are most coherent with a given set of beliefs
and desires. Furthermore, to an agent that is part of a normative system, it would tell
the agent whether certain norms are coherent with its cognitions. This might help an
agent to know whether to obey or violate a norm. this leads naturally to the notion of
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reasoning across graphs, and to explore the coherence or incoherence that might exist
between nodes of different graphs.
In a multi-context system, reasoning across context is done by the help of bridge
rules. Here our contexts are not merely sets of cognitions, but coherence graphs.
That is, we need an inference mechanism that relates individual coherence graphs.
We achieve this with the help of certain composition functions that connect individ-
ual graphs by taking into account the influence of graphs on each other. Later in the
section, we take bridge rules as an example to show how we can reason across graphs
using composition functions applied over bridge rules.
6.2.1 Composition Functions
We break down the graph composition in two phases. The first deals with extending
some of the graphs by due to the influence of other graphs in the composition. The
second phase deals with joining these graphs by linking nodes of different graphs. For
the purpose, we define two kinds of functions, graph node extension functions (denoted
with ε) and edge extension functions (denoted with ι) to achieve the composition of
graphs.
The first phase of the graph composition takes into account the influence of graphs
on each other. Let’s assume, for instance, that an agent wants it to be the case that
whenever there the agent has an intention (Iϕ, r) in its intention graph, then it wants
to infer the corresponding belief (Bϕ, r) in the belief graph. The extension function
models such scenarios.
Definition 10 Given n > 0, we say that a function ε : Gn → Gn is a graph extension
function if, given a tuple of graphs g¯ = 〈g1, · · · , gn〉 in Gn, ε(g¯) = g¯′ is such that
• V ′i ⊇ Vi
• E′i = Ei
• ρ′i|Vi : Vi → [0, 1] such that ρ′i|Vi(Bϕ, r) = r where (Bϕ, r) ∈ Vi
• ζ ′i = ζi.
Let E denote the set of all graph extension functions (for a fixed n).
One of the desirable properties of E is the existence of a fixed point. This is because
the fixed point would give us a terminating condition for the repeated application of
extension functions. We call h¯ a fixed point of a subset of E if the repeated application
of its extension functions does not change h¯.
Definition 11 Given n, j > 0, we say that a sequence is an extension sequence if,
given a tuple of graphs g¯ ∈ Gn and a set of functions S ⊆ E ,
g0 = {g¯}, · · · , gi = {ε(h¯) | h¯ ∈ gi−1 ∧ ε ∈ S}, · · ·
and say that the elements of gj are fixed points of S applied over g¯ (denoted as S∗(g¯))
if gj = gj−1. Further, we say that the fixed point is unique if |S∗(g¯)| = 1.
34 CHAPTER 6. AN ARCHITECTURE FOR COHERENCE-DRIVEN AGENTS
The second phase of the composition joins all graphs together and adds additional
edges between the nodes of the original graphs. Consider our previous example and
let’s assume that our agent further wants it the case that, the belief and the intention
nodes are related and have a positive coherence between them. The function ι takes n
graphs and joins the graphs by adding new edges between related nodes. We have the
following definition for ι:
Definition 12 Given n > 0, we say that a function ι : Gn → G is a graph join function
if given a tuple of graphs g¯ in Gn, ι(g¯) = 〈V,E, ρ, ζ〉 such that:
• V =
⋃
1≤i≤n
{〈ϕ, i〉 | ϕ ∈ Vi}
• E ⊇
⋃
1≤i≤n
{{〈ϕ, i〉, 〈ψ, i〉} | {ϕ,ψ} ∈ Ei}
• ρ : V → [0, 1] such that ρ(〈ϕ, i〉) = ρi(ϕ)
• ζ : E → [−1, 1] such that ζ(〈ϕ, i〉, 〈γ, i〉) = ζi(ϕ, γ)
Let J denote the set of all ι functions (for a fixed n).
Now we define the composition of graphs in a tuple g¯ by combining the two functions
ε and ι. That is, we apply the set of functions T ⊆ J on the fixed point of the set of
functions S ⊆ E applied over g¯. The union of all the resulting graphs is defined as a
composition of graphs. Note that here we assume S has a unique fixed point applied
over any tuple of graphs g¯. It is however a fare assumption given that we can construct
the functions in S and T according to the requirements.
Definition 13 Given n > 0, we say that a function ς : Gn → G is a graph composition
function if, given a tuple of graphs g¯ in Gn, a set of functions S ⊆ E with a unique
fixed point and a set of functions T ⊆ J then ς(g¯) =
⋃
ι∈T
ι(S∗(g¯)).
6.2.2 Bridge Rules — A Set of Composition Functions
Now we define one such set of graph composition functions by means of a set of bridge
rules. Bridge rules have been traditionally used to make inferences across contexts.
Here we extend the use of it to make coherence associations across graphs.
Definition 14 Given n > 0, a bridge rule b is a rule of the form
i1 : (A1, r1), i2 : (A2, r2), · · · , iq : (Aq, rq)
j : (A, f(r1, r2, · · · , rq))
with:
• 1 ≤ ik ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ q
• 1 ≤ q ≤ n
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• 1 ≤ j ≤ n
• A, Ak are formula schemata and r, rk ∈ [0, 1]
• f : [0, 1]q → [0, 1] where 1 ≤ q ≤ n
Let B denote the set of all such bridge rules.
Given a bridge rule b ∈ B, we derive a pair of functions from them. The first function
is from the set E and we define it as extending the graph in the position j in the tuple
with a new formula node represented by the formula schemata A. The second function
is from the set J and we define it as a set of coherence functions between formulas
represented by the schemata Ak and A. That is, we extend the coherence function ζ to
make inferences across graphs.
Definition 15 Given a tuple of graphs g¯ = 〈g1, g2, · · · , gn〉, a bridge rule
i1 : (A1, r1), i2 : (A2, r2), · · · , iq : (Aq, rq)
j : (A, f(r1, r2, · · · , rq))
as in Definition 14 and if, for all k we have (pi(Ak), rk) ∈ Vk, where pi is the most
general substitution making the formula schemata Ak match nodes in Vk, then an ex-
tension function ε and a join function ι are derived from b as:
1. ε(g¯) = 〈g1, g2, · · · , g′j , · · · , gn〉 where g′j = 〈V ′j , E′j , ρ′j , ζ ′j〉 with
• V ′j = Vj ∪ {pi(A), f(r1, r2, · · · , rq)}
• E′j = Ej
• ρ′j(v) = ρj(v) for all v ∈ Vj
ρ′j((pi(Ak), f(r1, r2, · · · , rq))) = f(r1, r2, · · · , rq) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ q
• ζ ′j(v, w) = ζj(v, w) for all v, w ∈ Vj
2. ι(g¯) = 〈V,E, ρ, ζ〉 as in Definition 12 such that:
For all 1 ≤ k ≤ q, and 1 ≤ m ≤ q:
• V =
⋃
i 6=j
Vi
• {pi(Ak), pi(A)} ∈ E;
• {pi(Ak), pi(Am)} ∈ E;
• η(pi(Ak), pi(A)) = q + 2;
• η(pi(Ak), pi(Am)) = q + 2
• ζ(v, w) = 1/min{η(v, w), η(w, v)} for all v, w ∈ V
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6.2.3 Application of Composition Functions — An Example
Here we consider one such bridge rule and derive both a graph extension function ε and
a graph join function ι in the context of generating a composition of graphs gB ∈ GB ,
gD ∈ GD, and gI ∈ GI .
1. Given a bridge rule
b =
1 : (Bψ, r), 2 : (Dψ, s)
3 : (Iψ,min(r, s))
Where the indices 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the contexts C1, C2, and C3 which
are associated with the graphs gB , gD and gI respectively.
2. And Given (Bψ, 0.95) ∈ gB , (Dψ, 0.95) ∈ gD
Applying the graph extension function ε : Gn → Gn, we update the graph gI as below.
• VI = VI ∪ (Iψ, 0.95)
• ρI(Iψ, 0.95) = 0.95
Now applying the graph join function ι : Gn → G, we update the composition graph
g = 〈V,E, ρ, ζ〉 which is the composition of the graphs gB , gD and gI as below.
• E = EB ∪ ED ∪ EI ∪ {{(Iψ, 0.95), (Bψ, 0.95)}, {(Iψ, 0.95), (Dψ, 0.95)}}
• ζ((Iψ, 0.95), (Bψ, 0.95)) = 0.33;
ζ((Iψ, 0.95), (Dψ, 0.95)) = 0.33
6.3 Coherence-driven Agents
Given the cognitive and norm coherence graphs and the composition functions, we can
now turn our attention to formally define a coherence-driven agent. Recall that, the
MCS specification of an agent is a group of interconnected contexts 〈{Ci}, B〉. Each
context is a tuple Ci = 〈Li, Ai,∆i〉 where Li, Ai and ∆i are the language, axioms,
and inference rules respectively. In our extension of MCS, a coherence-driven agent
will further have a function f that maps the set of contexts to a set of corresponding co-
herence graphs. And a function h that maps a set of bridge rules to a set of graph com-
position functions. These extensions are due to the introduction of coherence graphs
into the contexts. An agent will need both the graph construction functions and a set
of deduction mechanisms to reason within and between graphs. For the BDI agents
considered here, the contexts are C1, C2, C3 and C4 which determine a belief graph
gB , a desire graph gD, an intention graph gI and a norm graph gN respectively. Hence
we have the following definition:
Definition 16 A coherence-driven agent a is a tuple 〈{Ci}1≤i≤4, B, f, h〉 where {Ci}
is a family of contexts, B ⊆ B is a set of bridge rules, f : {Ci} → G maps contexts to
coherence graphs, and h : B → E × J maps bridge rules to pairs of graph extension
and graph join functions.
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In the following we describe the process that a coherence-driven agent follows in a
normative multi agent system. A coherence-driven agent always tries to maximise co-
herence, and takes each action based on how it helps in maximising coherence. How-
ever, here we limit our discussions to analysing the agent’s reasoning with respect to
only those actions that are normative, since we are interested in the normative behavior
of the agent. We consider one basic normative action of the agent, namely norm evalu-
ation. Norm evaluation corresponds to assessing the norm with regard to the situation
of the agent, its beliefs, and the goals it wants to achieve. The two situations in which
we consider norm evaluation as necessary are norm adoption and norm compliance or
violation. The need for norm adoption occurs when:
1. an agent joins a normative system;
2. a normative system it is part of, tries to modify an existing norm;
3. a normative system it is part of, proposes a new norm for adoption.
Norm compliance or violation occurs when:
1. there is a change in the external environment (such as the joining of new agents
in the normative system);
2. there is a change in the internal cognition of the agent (such as adopting a new
intention).
Ignoring the conceptual difference in evaluations in both the above cases, we concen-
trate on how norm evaluation is carried out. A coherence-driven agent evaluates a norm
by evaluating the coherence of the composite graph of its cognitions and norms. Below
we detail the norm evaluation process when, in particular, the agent encounters a new
graded belief (Bϕ, r) (either communicated to the agent by others, by observation, or
internally deduced). Other situations discussed above can be similarly evaluated.
Below we describe the procedure a coherence-driven agent follows when it encoun-
ters a new belief. We assume the following input for the procedure. To simplify the
algorithm, we assume just one bridge rule as part of the input.
• norm to be evaluated n;
• the new belief (Bϕ, r);
• the cognitive and norm coherence graphs of the agent gB , gD, gI , and gN ;
• a bridge rule b ∈ B.
1: v := (Bϕ, r)
2: VB := VB ∪ {v}
3: ρB(v) := r
4: for all w ∈ VB do
5: compute ζ(v, w) using Definition 7.
6: if ζ(v, w) is defined then
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7: EB := EB ∪ {{v, w}}
8: end if
9: end for
10: g¯ := 〈gB , gD, gI , gN 〉
11: g¯′ := ε(g¯)
12: while g¯ 6= g¯′ do
13: g¯ := g¯′
14: g¯′ := ε(g¯) where ε as in Definition 10 derived from bridge rule b
15: end while
16: g′′ := ι(〈g′B , g′D, g′I , g′N 〉) where ι as in Definition 12 derived from b
17: g := ς(g¯′′) where ς as in Definition 13
18: for all (Ai, V \ Ai), Ai ⊆ V do
19: calculate σ(g,Ai) using Definition 4.1
20: end for
21: κ := κ(g) using Definition 4.2
22: A := Ai|max(σ(g,Ai))
23: if n ∈ A then
24: adopt or comply norm n
25: else
26: reject or violate norm n
27: end if
The lines from 1 to 9 updates the graphs by incorporating the new belief and its
influences on other beliefs. Lines from 10 to 15 extends the graphs of other cognitions
and norms by taking into account the influence of the new belief (Bϕ, r). The graph
extension function ε is used to extend the graphs. Note that we apply the extension
function until we reach the fixed point. In line 16, the composite graph g′′ is constructed
using the graph join function ι. And finally in Line 17 the composition function makes
the union of all join functions to get the composite graph g.
In the second part of the algorithm, lines from 17 to 21 determines the coherence
maximising partition. This is done by first computing the strength of each partition
using the function σ and choosing the partition (A, V \ A) for which σ(g,A) is maxi-
mal. In the above algorithm we make an assumption that there is only one accepted set
corresponding to the maximum value of σ(g,Ai). However this is not true, because
even if there is just one partition (A, V \A) corresponding to the maximum, A and its
dual V \ A are already two accepted sets which produces the same maximum value of
coherence. In addition there could be other partitions which maximises the coherence.
According to the guidelines discussed in Chapter 4, we can decide on the favourable
accepted set. However it should also be remembered that, coherence maximisation is
more about understanding which pieces of information can be accepted together rather
than providing an ultimate answer to which piece of information should be accepted.
Finally lines 22 to 26 checks whether the norm to be evaluated n is part of the
accepted set A associated with the coherence maximising partition. Note that this
algorithm assumes that our agents are coherence maximising agents and the only factor
influencing decisions is coherence maximisation. However, needless to point out that
there could be other factors influencing such a decision which is not the focus of this
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paper.
Another important observation is regarding the values of function σ. In theory
coherence of the graph κ(g) is set as the maximum of the strength values σ(Ai, V \Ai),
in reality this could be very much dependent on the agent. If the inclusion of a norm
only slightly reduces the coherence of the graph, a mildly distressed agent may choose
to ignore the incoherence, may be satisfied with lowering the degree associated with
a particular belief, may still choose to follow a norm. Where as a heavily distressed
agent may not only chose to violate a norm, but initiate a dialogue to campaign for a
norm change.
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Chapter 7
Example — Norm Evaluation
We apply the formalism developed in the previous sections to model norm evaluation in
a real scenario. The example is motivated by the water sharing treaty signed between
the southern states of India during 1892 and 1924 and the disputes thereafter [29].
The objectives of this example are threefold. First, to demonstrate how self-interested
agents working together evaluate norms. Second, to show the need for norm adaptation
inspired by individual coherence evaluations, whereas the grander aim is to set up a
framework for norm adaptation itself, which will be our future work. And third, to
open new application areas in norm evaluation where such cognitive theories could be
applied.
We describe now the reasoning performed by a coherence-driven agent. We sim-
plify the case for brevity, considering just two agents s and t standing for two distinct
Indian states. We model the reasoning of s in two snapshots of time t1 and t2, one
when the first treaty is about to be signed (i.e, the decision to adopt the norm) and the
second after a period of working together, when the situation has evolved.
7.1 Terminology
To represent the cognitions and norms concerning an agent, we shall have belief, de-
sire, intention and norm languages as defined in Section 6.1. Hence, (Bϕ, r) repre-
sents that the agent believes that proposition ϕ is true (in a near future world1) with
degree r. (Propositions (Dϕ, r), and (Iϕ, r) are desires and intentions and are in-
terpreted analogously). The statements about the world are in propositional language
where each proposition is a triple of the form 〈object, attribute, value〉. For instance
〈urbanization, growth index, high〉 states that there is a high growth in urbanisa-
tion. Note that, we do not have an explicit norm coherence graph in this example, as
graded normative language is under research currently. However, we represent norms
accepting a norm by beliefs about the norms and intentions on its consequences.
1In our representation we refer to future worlds as the agent is trying to anticipate the coherence of future
worlds where the norm is accepted or rejected.
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ϕ11 〈river basin, water index, adequate〉
ϕ12 〈rain fall, index, good〉
ϕ13 〈water release, quantity, 300 billion ft3〉
ϕ14 〈s2 threat, type,military force〉
ϕ15 〈s2 threat, status, realised〉
ϕ16 〈treaty proposal, status, accepted〉
ϕ17 〈internal demand, status, satisfied〉
Table 7.1: Propositions relevant for s1’s cognitions at t1
The bridge rules we use in the water-sharing example are the following. These are
chosen for illustration purposes, however the bridge rules can be chosen according to
the characteristics of the agent we want to model.
1. b1 =
3:(Iψ,r)
2:(Bψ,r) : Whenever there is an intention (Iψ, r) in context C3, then a
corresponding belief (Bψ, r) is inferred in context C1.
2. b2 =
1:(Bψ,r),2:(Dψ,s)
3:(Iψ,min(r,s)) : Whenever there is a belief ψ with a degree r in C1 and a
desire ψ with a degree s in C2, then a corresponding intention ψ with a degree
min(r, s) is inferred in the context C3.
7.2 Norm Adoption
Snapshot t1 : 1892
Agent : s
Action: Evaluating the proposal of the water sharing treaty.
Norm to be evaluated: agent s should release 300 billion ft3 of water to agent t annu-
ally.
Agent s reasons by injecting into its internal coherence graph g1 = 〈V1, E1, ρ1, ζ1〉,
the anticipated consequences of the norm adoption and compares the coherence on
signing the treaty as opposed to not signing it. Here we use coherence as the primary
mechanism for decision making, however, in the future we shall analyse also the influ-
ence of sanctions and rewards. Although in our framework sanctions related to norms
are not modeled explicitly, we take into account their influences in forming the agent
modalities. Below we list the propositions relevant to forming the agent cognitions and
then the cognitions V1 of agent s at t1:
Below we analyse the hypothetical reasoning that the agent s does to evaluate the norm,
i.e (ϕ16 → Oϕ13, 1) , where ϕ16 = 〈treaty proposal, status, accepted〉 and ϕ13 =
〈water release, quantity, 300 billion ft3〉. Since we reason in terms of the beliefs
about the norms, we have the following to represent the norm:
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(Bϕ11, 0.90) (Bϕ12, 0.75)
Beliefs (Bϕ14, 1)
(Bϕ11 ∧ ϕ12 ∧ ϕ13)→ ϕ17, 1)
(Bϕ14 ∧ ¬ϕ16 → ϕ15, 1) (Bϕ16 → ¬ϕ15, 1)
Desires (Dϕ17, 0.95) (D¬ϕ15, 1)
Intentions (Iϕ17, 0.95) (I¬ϕ15, 1)
Table 7.2: s1’s cognitions (V1) at snapshot t1
7.2.1 Case 1: s accepts the treaty {B(ϕ16, 1), (Iϕ13, 1)}
Accepting to sign the treaty is equivalent to incorporating an additional belief that at a
near future world, (ϕ16 is true with degree 1 and an additional intention to make it true.
That is, V1 := V1 ∪ {(Bϕ16, 1), (Iϕ13, 1)}. Below we calculate the coherence of the
agent in conjunction with these additional cognitions. Applying themax-cut algorithm,
we have the coherence maximising partition (A, V \ A) as shown in the Figure 7.1.
The corresponding coherence of the graph, κ(g1) is 4.41/16 = 0.275625.
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Figure 7.1: Coherence graph (g1), with norm accepted κ(g1) = 0.275625
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ϕ21 〈urbanisation, growth index, high〉
ϕ22 〈industrialisation, growth index, high〉
ϕ23 〈water usage, growth index, high〉
ϕ24 〈revenue, growth index, high〉
Table 7.3: Propositions related to s1’s cognitions at snapshot t2
(B¬ϕ11, 0.2) (B¬ϕ12, 0.75)
(Bϕ14, 0.75) (Bϕ21, 0.90)
(Bϕ22, 0.90) (Bϕ13, 1)
Beliefs (B¬ϕ11 ∧ ¬ϕ12 ∧ p23 ∧ ϕ13 → ¬ϕ17, 0.90) (Bϕ14 ∧ ¬ϕ16 → ϕ15, 0.75)
(Bϕ21 ∧ ϕ22 → ϕ23, 1) (Bϕ24 → ϕ21, 1)
(Bϕ24 → ϕ22, 1) (Bϕ17 → ϕ24, 0.75)
(Bϕ16 → ¬ϕ15, 1) (Bϕ24 → ϕ23, 0.80)
Desires (Dϕ17, 0.95) (Dϕ24, 0.85)
(D¬ϕ15, 1)
Intentions (Iϕ17, 0.95) (Iϕ24, 0.85)
(I¬ϕ15, 1) (Iϕ16, 1)
Table 7.4: s1’s cognitions at snapshot t2
7.2.2 Case 2: s rejects the treaty (B¬ϕ16, 1)
The differences if s decides not to accept the treaty are that it has the additional be-
lief (Bϕ15, 1) whereas it removes the intention (I¬ϕ15, 1) as it is reasonable to as-
sume that agent t will realise the threat upon rejecting the treaty. That is V1 :=
V1 ∪ {(B¬ϕ16, 1), (Bϕ15, 1)} \ {(I¬ϕ15, 1)}. With these changes, we have the the
coherence of the graph as κ(g1) = 3.07/16 = 0.191875. As a coherence-driven agent
seeks coherence maximisation, s prefers to adopt the treaty guided by its coherence
value. However we do not rule out the possibilities of other considerations of the agent
that can influence its final decision.
7.3 The Incoherence Buildup
Snapshot t2 : 1991
Agent : s
Action: Updating cognitive graph based on situation change.
New Facts: s experiences large-scale industrialisation, urbanisation, higher water us-
age, threat from t to obey the norm, and less amount of rain fall.
Below we list the propositions capturing this change in situation and the changed cog-
nitions of the agent s at t2:
The coherence graph g2 of the agent s with changed cognitions is shown in Fig-
ure 7.2. Some of the cognitions that do not influence the result have not been included
in g2 for the sake of clarity. Using the coherence equations, the coherence maximis-
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Figure 7.2: Coherence graph (g2), κ(g2) = .29
ing partition (A, V \ A) is shown in Figure 7.2. The partition interestingly places the
cognitions about ϕ24 and ϕ17 in set A while the cognitions about ϕ16 and ¬ϕ15 in set
V \A. It is clear from the coherence evaluation that all these intentions cannot coexist
while maintaining the maximum coherence. That is, the agent has to choose between
obeying the norm, hence avoiding the threat of military action and satisfying the inter-
nal demands for water, hence economic progress. Even though the ultimate decision
can vary from other considerations of the agent, a purely coherence maximising agent
will choose to violate the norm in order to keep a maximal state of coherence. With this
example we show how a coherence maximising agent evaluates norms in the context
of its cognitions.
7.4 Discussion
Even though the example only demonstrates the case of a single norm, the same can be
extended to cases where there are multiple norms and there is a need to choose among
the norms. In terms of coherence, this is selecting a norm (or a set of norms) which
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maximises the coherence of the graph. By performing the hypothetical analysis of a
norm being accepted, norms can be ordered according to the coherence each would
generate in the resulting adoption. Another point to note is that here we have assumed
our agents to be coherence maximising. But in reality there are other criteria that need
to be considered. Some of them already mentioned and represented in the graph are
sanctions and rewards. Another important factor by which an agent makes a decision
to adopt a norm is observing the behavior of other agents. We can represent this as
cognitive models of other agents.
7.4.1 Computational Complexity
We have implemented some important functions of the coherence framework. We can
show that the popular max-cut problem can be converted to an equivalent coherence
maximising problem. As max-cut is an NP-complete problem it becomes clear that co-
herence maximisation is also an NP-complete problem. However neural network based
algorithms give good approaximation. Thagard in his formalisation of coherence has
given several implementations of coherence , with an extensive implementation of a
neural network model called ECHO [26]. He also compares it with a max-cut im-
plementation. We have extended Thagard’s implementation to incorporate additional
features of our model. That is, The solutions in our implementation we use a Prolog-
based meta interpreter to extract proofs of each sentence in the BDI base of the agent
where these proofs will give raise to the coherence values between pairs of sentences
using the support function η of Section 3. We further use a semi-definite program-
ming max-cut approximation algorithm to evaluate the coherence of the graph and to
determine the nodes in the accepted set [28].
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Ongoing Work
In this dissertation, we proposed a coherence based framework which extends the pop-
ular BDI architecture by including the notion of coherence. Coherence-driven agents
take actions based on coherence maximisation as opposed to utility based agents max-
imising utility. We show that coherence maximisation gives the necessary autonomy to
the agents to take decisions considering dependencies among cognitions and external
commitments. We show, in particular, how an agent could evaluate a norm by max-
imising coherence. We provide a coherence function and its properties to construct
coherence graphs from a set of pieces of information. We also provide functions to
compute the coherence of a graph and for composing different types of graphs, so that,
an agent could consider the overall effects of different cognitions and external commit-
ments.
However there are questions asked about the philosophy behind coherence. One
question often put forward with respect to the application of coherence as an agent
decision making tool is whether it is rational for an agent to behave according to co-
herence maximisation. Normally an agent reasoning about norms takes into account
influences of utility maximisation, models of other agents, and sanctions or rewards.
We claim that we can introduce these decision making factors into our coherence graph
so that the coherence maximisation is the only evaluation necessary for the decision
making process. To demonstrate that coherence can actually contain these factors, in
this chapter we show how utility maximisation (in the terminology of game theory) can
be reduced to coherence maximisation.
In fact, we see that coherence can be used to model different types of agents, a
utility maximising rational agent, a norm abiding institutional agent, a selfish agent, or
more importantly an autonomous social agent. We show in the following section that
a utility function can be reduced to a specific type of coherence graph. For the norm
abiding institutional agents, a coherence maximisation immediately provides a clear
answer. If there are conflicts between norms and cognitions, the coherence maximising
partition puts the norms on one set of the partition, whereas the cognitions go to its
complimentary set. Then a norm abiding agent always chose the set with the norms
included. A selfish agent on the other hand, always chose the set with its cognitions
included ignoring the norms.
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Another important question is about the credibility of a coherence-based evaluation.
For example, coherence-based evaluation gives an impression of a black box churning
out results, when compared to, for instance, an argumentation-based system, which
would give explicit reasons why an argument is the best in terms of its de-feasibility.
The difference between an argumentation system and a coherence-based system is that,
a coherence-based system maximises the overall coherence, giving less importance to
particular pieces of information, where as in an argumentation system, its a particular
piece of information that is important than the overall system. Further, we have based
our framework on sound theoretic framework, computing the coherence graph using
the properties of the coherence function.
Another related question is about the computational feasibility of coherence max-
imisation. Unlike other proposals on coherence maximisation, in this dissertation, we
have introduced a fully computational framework of coherence. However, as we have
stated in Section 7.4.1, coherence maximisation is an NP-complete problem. But, as
we assume bounded rationality for our agents, our coherence graphs are also bounded
and is not complete. Further we are exploring ways to bring in contexts, which would
consider only a sub-graph of the actual with the intuition that coherence maximisation
should consider only those nodes which are relevant to the problem at hand. In Sec-
tion 8.2, we explore the semantic interpretation of coherence, which when extended
gives us the notion of an evidential set. We plan to explore this as part of our future
work.
In the remaining sections we list some of the directions we are working on. These
are intended to give a glimpse of the general direction of research, however, not per-
fected from a technical point of view.
8.1 Coherence as an Inclusive Notion of Rationality
As stated in the introduction to the chapter, we here take up a specific notion in game
theory and show how that notion can be reduced to a coherence graph. The aim of
this reduction is to demonstrate that, the notion of utility which is fundamental to a
rational agent can be modelled in a coherence graph. We however assume that there is
an apriori preference established by the agent.
Preferences are relevant when it is necessary to examine the behaviour of an indi-
vidual, called a player, who must choose from among a set of outcomes O.
Definition 17 A preference relation onO is a binary relation onO such that ∀o, p ∈
O
1. o  p if and only if o is at least as preferable as p.
2. if o  p but not p  o, then o is strictly prefered p denoted as o  p.
3. if o  p and p  o then o is equivalent to p denoted as o ∼ p.
We assume that the following properties hold for our strict preference relation 
and equivalence relation ∼. These properties can be derived from the more basic as-
sumptions that  is asymmetric and transitive. ∀o, p, s, t ∈ O
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1.  is complete: if o 6= p, then either o  p or p  o or both
2.  is transitive: if o  p and p  s, then o  s
3. ∼ is reflexive: o ∼ o
4. ∼ is symmetric: if o ∼ p then p ∼ o
5. ∼ is transitive: if o ∼ p and p ∼ s, then o ∼ s
6. if t ∼ o, o  p, and p ∼ s, then t  p and o  s.
A utility function assigns a numerical value to each of the outcomes in O such
that the preference relation is respected. There are many utility functions that can
represent the same preference relation. Note that preferences are ordinal, that is, they
specify the ranking of the alternatives, but not how far apart they are from each other
(intensity). Cardinal properties are those that are not preserved under strictly increasing
transformations. For example, because the function assigns numerical values to various
alternatives, the magnitude of any differences in the utility between two alternatives is
cardinal. We want to use a utility function because instead of examining conditions
under which preference relations produce maximal elements for a set of alternatives, it
is easier to specify the numerical representation and then apply standard optimisation
techniques to find the maximum. Thus, the best options from the set O are precisely
the options that have the maximum utility. More formally,
Definition 18 A function u : O → R is a utility function representing preference
relation  if the following holds for all o, p ∈ O: o  p⇔ u(o) > u(p).
At this point, it is worth emphasising that players do not have utility functions. Rather,
they have preferences, which we can represent (for analytical purposes) with utility
functions.
8.1.1 A Utility Coherence Graph
Now we reduce the utility function for preference relation  to a coherence graph
with certain properties. Our aim in this reduction is to show that such a graph can be
constructed for any preference relation  which satisfies the properties in 8.1.
Theorem 8.1.1 Given a finite set of outcomes O and a utility function u : O → [0, 1]
there exists a coherence graph g such that the accepted setA of its coherence maximis-
ing partition is
A = {argmax
o∈O
u(o)}
To prove the theorem, we need to prove the following propositions.
Proposition 8.1.2 Given a finite set of outcomes O and a utility function u : O →
[0, 1], there exists a coherence graph g such that
1. ∀o, p ∈ O, u(o) > u(p)⇔ σ(g, {o}) > σ(g, {p})
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2. Given O′ ⊆ O such that 0 ≤ |O′| ≤ b |O|2 c and |O′| 6= 1 we have
∀o ∈ O′ σ(g, {o}) > σ(g,O′)
Sketch of the proof: Let g = 〈O,E, ρ, ζ〉 be a coherence graph such that
• E are all subsets of 2 elements of O
• for all o, p ∈ O u(o) > u(p) iff ρ(o) > ρ(p)
• for all o ∈ O ρ(o) > max
S⊆O\{o},|S|=n−2
Σq∈Sρ(q)
• for all o, p ∈ O ζ(o, p) = −1
1.:
u(o) > u(p) ⇔ ρ(o) > ρ(p) (property of g)
≡ ρ(o) · Σq∈O\{o,p}ρ(q) + ρ(o) · ρ(p) > ρ(p) · Σq∈O\{o,p}ρ(q)
+ρ(p) · ρ(o)
≡ ρ(o) · Σq∈O\{o}ρ(q) > ρ(p) · Σq∈O\{p}ρ(q)
≡ σ(g, {o}) > σ(g, {p})
2.:
Let O′ ⊆ O such that 0 ≤ |O′| ≤ b |O|2 c and |O′| 6= 1.
Then we have that
max
S⊆O\{o},|S|=n−2
Σq∈Sρ(q) > Σq∈O\O′ρ(q)
Consequently,
ρ(o) > Σq∈O\O′ρ(q)
ρ(o)(Σq∈O′\{o}ρ(q) + Σq∈O\O′ρ(q)) > (ρ(o) + Σq∈O′\{o}ρ(q))Σq∈O\O′ρ(q)
ρ(o) · Σq∈O\{o}ρ(q) > Σq∈O′ρ(q) · Σq∈O\O′ρ(q)
σ(g, {o}) > σ(g,O′)
Hence, we may prove the theorem as follows:
1. From Proposition 1.1 we have that given u(o) > u(p), coherence maximisa-
tion would always select {o} over {p} as the accepted set since σ(g, {o}) >
σ(g, {p}).
2. Proposition 1.2 states that, the value of σ for a singleton set is always higher that
that of any set which includes this singleton set. Hence coherence maximisation
always select singleton sets as accepted sets over any set including them.
However, note that a graph with the stated properties is not easy to imagine. Our
future work includes restating the properties purely in terms of function ρ or in other
words, finding a distribution for values of ρ which satisfies the stated properties of the
graph.
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8.2 A Semantical Approach
Using proof-theory, we have demonstrated that coherence is a fully computable phe-
nomena. However, to expand its reach to all types of coherence, we need a more
general definition. Here we introduce the semantic interpretation of coherence in terms
of degrees of consistency by Ruspini. That is, we interpret coherence as a similarity
function between possible world. This interpretation gives us a larger framework to
analyse different types of coherence by changing the similarity function.
In this section we propose a semantical formalisation of coherence using the notion
of degrees of consistency introduced by Ruspini in [23]. Ruspini in his work inter-
prets the similarity between two propositions, by the similarity between the worlds in
which the propositions are true. Using this interpretation, we define coherence as the
similarity between possible worlds.
We first introduce the basic definitions from Ruspini’s degree’s of consistency and
then define coherence in terms of it. For the sake of clarity we restrict now our attention
to propositional languages. Let L be a propositional language andW a set of classical
interpretations of L (i.e. a set of possible worlds). For any w ∈W and any proposition
p ∈ L, we denote by w |= p the fact that proposition p is true in the interpretation w.
First we introduce some basic definitions.
Definition 19 A function T : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a triangular norm if and only if:
1. T is commutative and associative
2. T is non-decreasing in both arguments
3. T (1, x) = x and T (0, x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]
Definition 20 Given a triangular norm T , ST : W × W → [0, 1], where T is a
triangular norm where the function is continuous (t-norm for short), is a T-similarity
function if and only if ST satisfies the following properties:
1. Reflexivity: ST (w,w) = 1
2. Symmetry: ST (w,w′) = ST (w′, w)
3. T-Transitivity: ST (w,w′) ≥ T (ST (w,w′′), ST (w′′, w′))
The function assigns a degree of similarity between 0 (corresponding to maximum
dissimilarity) and 1 (corresponding to maximum similarity). For the sake of simplicity,
ST is required to fulfill that ifST (w,w′) = 1 thenw = w′. The transitivity requirement
allows ST to become a generalised equivalence relation.
Ruspini generalises the semantical entailment relationship between propositions.
He defines both an implication function and a consistency function between proposi-
tions. The definition of partial implication between propositions is based on conditions
that determine whether, given two propositions p and q, one of them implies the other
to the degree n. We introduce the formal definitions below:
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Definition 21 Given a T-similarity relation ST and propositions p, q ∈ L, the degree
of implication Imp(p | q) is given by :
Imp(p | q) = inf
w′|=q
sup
w|=p
ST (w,w′)
Given a T-similarity relation ST and propositions p, q ∈ L, degree of consistency
Con(p | q) is given by:
Con(p | q) = sup
w′|=q
sup
w|=p
ST (w,w′)
Observe that the degree of consistency Con is a symmetric measure while the de-
gree of implication Imp is not. Nevertheless, Imp has the T-transitivity property of
similarity. Moreover, for any formulas p, q ∈ L, Con(p | q) ≥ Imp(p | q).
By definition of the implication and consistency measures it is easy to check that
Imp(p | q) = 1 iff q |= p whereas Con(p | q) = 1 iff q 6|= ¬p. Now we state some
basic properties of the consistency degree for L with δ, β, γ ∈ L and n,m ∈ [0, 1]:
1. Con(δ ∧ β | β) = 1 iff δ, β 6|=
2. Con(δ ∨ β | β) = 1 iff δ, β 6|=
3. If Con(γ | δ) = n and Con(γ | β) = m, then Con(γ | δ ∨ β) = max(n,m)
4. If Con(γ | δ ∧ β) = 1 then Con(γ | δ) = 1 and Con(γ | β) = 1
5. If Con(γ | δ ∨ β) = n then Con(γ | δ) ≤ n and Con(γ | β) ≤ n
6. Con(δ | ¬δ) = 0
Now we can define a coherence function κ′ : T × T → [−1, 1] on T in terms of
degrees of consistency as follows:
Definition 22 Let T be a finite set of formulas of a language L. For any pair (δ, β) of
formulas in T , a coherence function κ′ : T × T → [−1, 1] on T is
κ′(δ, β) =
{
undefined if Con(δ, β) = 0
2 · Con(δ, β)− 1 otherwise
Note that, the coherence function κ always takes nonzero values. However, he
consistency function Con is defined for the entire interval [−1, 1]. If Con(δ, β) = 0
for any propositions δ and β, then there is no consistency between worlds in which δ
is true and those in which β is true. Hence, we can safely make κ(δ, β) as undefined.
8.3 Future Work
In this dissertation, we have demonstrated a coherence-driven agent, or in other words,
we have shown how a coherence based framework is beneficial to an individual agent.
Coherence not only is interesting to an individual agent, but is also a relevant concept at
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the social level. In our future work, we would like to take coherence to the social level,
where parallel concepts of Pareto efficiency and Nash equilibrium can be defined in
terms of coherence. This would give the agents a more general notion than rationality,
which encompasses notions of fairness. Thus, our aim is to provide a more general
framework for normative multiagent systems which is dynamic and have equilibrium
conditions in terms of coherence.
In this dissertation, we have formalised one specific type of coherence, namely the
deductive coherence. However, deductive coherence was chosen, only for the sound
theoretical base that we have in the underlying logic. However for building practi-
cal coherence-driven agents, we need to look at other types of coherence. With the
help of ideas introduced in Section 8.2 of going work on semantical interpretation,
we would like to ex tend formalisation of coherence which would include many other
types. Since the semantic interpretation of coherence depends on a similarity func-
tion, it is possible to define this function between propositional elements in the case of
deductive coherence, or between concepts in the case of explanatory coherence. This
would help provide a more holistic notion of coherence.
In this dissertation, the treatment of norms were inadequate. More precisely, we
did not represent norms directly, but accepting a norm was equivalent to a belief in
the antecedent part of the norm and an intention to realise its consequent. That is we
expressed norms in terms of cognitions. However, we plan to have a norm language
similar to that of graded belief languages. As research on probabilistic standard deontic
logic [10] progresses, we incorporate this language into our framework. One of our
ongoing work, not mentioned here is to make the concept of norm more precise in
the language of coherence. Following many others, we treat norms as constraints on
cognitions, and we go one step forward by considering them as coherence constraints
between cognitions. This is one of our immediate future work.
We also would like to compare similar systems with our coherence framework such
as argumentation systems from practical reasoning, legal reasoning domains, constraint
satisfaction models from optimisation, dominant principles from economics.
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